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Labor economists have long used occupation indicators as a proxy for unobserved 
skills that a worker possesses.  In this paper, we consider whether inter-occupational 
wage differentials that are unexplained by measured human capital are indeed due to 
differences in often-unmeasured skill.  Using the National Compensation Survey, a large, 
nationally- representative dataset on jobs and ten different components of requisite skill, 
we compare the effects on residual wage variation of including occupation indicators and 
including additional skills measures.  We find that although skills do vary across 3-digit 
occupations, occupation indicators decrease wage residuals by far more than can be 
explained by skill differentials.  This indicates that “controlling for occupation” does not 
equate to controlling for skill alone, but also for some other factors to a great extent. 
Additionally, we find that there is considerable within occupation variation in 
skills, and that the amount of variation is not constant across skill levels.  As a result, 
including occupation indicators in a wage model introduces heteroskedasticity that must 
be accounted for.  We suggest that greater caution be applied when using and interpreting 
occupation indicators as controls in wage regressions. 
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I.  Introduction 
Occupations play a central role in labor markets. People get both formal education and 
on-the-job training to develop sets of skills that enable success in different categories of jobs. 
Those categories are occupations. Occupation classifications are used by both firms and workers 
to facilitate communication about the content of a job, which promotes more efficient screening 
of potential job applicants than otherwise might occur. The job requirements associated with any 
given occupation (e.g. doctor, lawyer, accountant, laborer, secretary, teacher, computer 
programmer) also provide a road map for those seeking to enter the occupation, whether by 
formal schooling, on the job training, or both. Without occupation classifications, therefore, there 
would be much less efficient resource allocation in the labor market. 
Despite this central role for occupations, there is no consensus within labor economics on 
the issue of how to use occupation classifications empirically. On the one hand, the conceptual 
argument for occupations as bundles of skills leads some economists to use occupation controls 
to hold constant unobserved skill differences, particularly when estimating human capital 
earnings or other labor market models. On the other hand, because people can and do switch 
occupations, and wages are presumed to be set at least partially by supply and demand, there are 
risks in viewing occupational wages as direct measures of the returns to skill.
1 For example, do 
doctors earn more than laborers because they have more skill, because of barriers to entry, or 
both? Clearly doctors learn real skills in medical school, so the occupational classifications 
represent more than just barriers to entry. Yet there also are barriers to entry created both 
naturally by the need for lengthy graduate education and on-the-job training, and artificially by 
                                                 
1 Also, because there is substantial occupational segregation along gender and racial lines, and that segregation is correlated with 
wages, there is intense debate whether occupations in these cases are proxies for true skills or for nonmarket factors (including 
discrimination) that are unrelated to skill. 
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licensing requirements. Thus the question is to what extent are occupations proxies for skills 
versus a convenient way of classifying jobs that is unrelated to objective measures of skills? 
While this question is critical for understanding the role of occupations (and skills) in the 
labor market, traditional data sets in economics are not suitable for the task because they only 
record occupation title and demographic characteristics of the person holding the job. This paper 
uses the National Compensation Survey (NCS), a new nationally-representative data set with 
measures of skill that are based on the job to examine this question in depth. The skill measures 
are derived from the behavioral science literature on job design, which uses concepts such as 
complexity of the job and degree of autonomy to compare and rate dissimilar jobs throughout the 
economy using uniform measurements. We are thus able to compare the effects on wage 
estimations of including occupation indicators as a proxy for unobserved skill versus using direct 
measures of those skills.  
We find that although skills do vary across 3-digit occupations, occupation indicators 
decrease wage residuals by far more than can be explained by skill differentials.  This indicates 
that “controlling for occupation” does not equate to controlling for skill alone, but also for some 
other factors to a great extent. Part of the inter-occupation wage variation is due to nonrandom 
sorting along demographic lines: gender and race controls decrease the residual wage variation 
that is not explained by the NCS skill controls but which is accounted for by occupation controls. 
Additionally, we find that there is considerable within occupation variation in skills, and that the 
amount of variation is not constant across skill levels. As a result, including occupation 
indicators in a wage model introduces heteroskedasticity that must be accounted for. We suggest 
that greater caution be applied when using and interpreting occupation indicators as controls in 
wage regressions. 
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The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the development of the 
occupation classification system and the extent to which skills have not been a main organizing 
logic for dividing jobs into similar groups. The next sections describe the NCS data and compare 
human capital earnings models estimated using the NCS and Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Following that we focus on the amount of residual inter-occupational wage variation that is 
accounted for by the NCS skill measures. The final section examines how including traditional 
occupation controls beyond the NCS skill measures introduces heteroskedasticity in human 
capital earnings models. 
II. A brief history of the occupation classification system 
“It should be the purpose of statistics of occupation… [to] show, so far as 
possible, not only the skill and intelligence of the worker, and his position in the 
industry,…but, as a means for the study of the risk, healthfulness, and numerous 
other problems connected with his occupation, they should show, also, the 
specific services rendered, work done, or processes performed by him” (Alba M. 
Edwards, 1911) 
In the nineteenth century, occupational classifications generally focused on the industry 
in which a worker was employed.  For example, one category in the 1880 Census occupation 
system is car makers, which clearly involves many different skills and types of tasks.  In fact, 
there are nearly 100 distinct manufacturing and professional occupations that contribute to 
making cars today.  On the other hand, the 1880 Census also contained separate categories for 
“clerks in stores”, “bookkeepers in stores”, “clerks and bookkeepers in banks”, “clerks and 
bookkeepers in companies”, “clerks and bookkeepers in offices” and “clerks and bookkeepers in 
railroad offices”, all of whom presumably possess similar skills and perform similar tasks.  
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In arguing for a major revision of the Census method of classifying occupations, Alba 
Edwards (1911, 1938, 1941) proposed that a worker should be classified not by the product she 
was making, but by the kind of work she was doing or service she was rendering.  He argued that 
since the aim of collecting statistics is to “better the social and economic condition of man” that 
such statistics should, in fact, measure this condition.  The Census Bureau first fully adopted this 
methodology in the 1940 Decennial Census.  At the same time, Edwards also realized that no 
perfect categorization of occupations is possible, both because the division of labor and vast 
number of industries in the economy prohibits a categorization that is both “sufficiently broad 
and sufficiently detailed”, and because the occupations are not always well-defined and change 
over time as “new processes in manufacturing are being devised.” (Edwards, 1911: 619-20) 
Labor economists often control for the effect of otherwise unobserved human capital on 
wages by including a series of occupation indicator variables in a wage regression, on the 
assumption that occupation categories measure the skills a worker must have to perform a 
particular job in that occupation.  It is not certain, however, that the occupational classification 
system successfully distinguishes the skills of workers.  First, it may not have correctly 
distinguished initial skill differences between occupations in 1940.  As Margo Conk (1978) 
notes, “Without providing an adequate definition of ‘skill’ or a criterion for determining it, the 
United States Census began to classify occupations according to skill.  To do this, the Census fell 
back on the ‘social’ component of its definition of an occupation, in short, on the divisions of 
ethnicity, race, sex and age within the American population.”  Thus, an occupation might be 
categorized as unskilled merely because there were many minority or female workers in the 
occupation.   
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The second problem with inferring skill from occupational classifications is that there is 
significant within-occupation skill variation that is entirely obscured by the Census classification. 
Certainly, there are differences among workers in their ability to perform tasks of high 
complexity, and there are differences among jobs in the level of task complexity and 
responsibility bestowed on the worker. It is harder, for example, to build an entire house than to 
install a bookshelf, yet the people who do part of that work in both cases are classified as 
carpenters by the Census. A copy editor for children’s books may require less knowledge than 
one responsible for scientific texts. And a police officer in a quiet rural area faces quite different 
job demands than one in a high crime urban area. In each case the job demands differ 
significantly within occupations (even “narrowly” defined 3 digit occupations), and so, too, 
might the skills of the people who work in those jobs. 
The third potential difficulty with inferring skill from occupational classifications is that 
both the mean skill level and the variation in skill within an occupation can change over time 
without being captured by changes in the occupational classification system adjustments.  As 
technology changes the nature of the production methods, jobs become up-skilled or down-
skilled, depending on the nature of the technology (see, for example, Autor, Levy and Murnane, 
2002)  This can lead to an occupation category becoming more skilled, less skilled, or having a 
higher variation in skill over time. 
III. The National Compensation Survey 
The National Compensation Survey (NCS) is a restricted-use dataset of information on 
up to 20 jobs each at nearly 20,000 nationally representative establishments in the non-farm, 
non-Federal U.S. economy in 1999.  The data are collected by field economists who visit 
sampled establishments and randomly select 5-20 workers from the site’s personnel records, 
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depending on establishment size. Through interviews with human resources representatives, 
detailed information about the jobs those workers hold is obtained. 
The data include information on the establishment, including its location, industry, 
whether privately or publicly owned, and whether operating for profit.  In addition, for the 
selected jobs, data are collected on unionization status, work hours, incentive pay, occupation 
and earnings. The NCS data measure the skills and wages of jobs—thus they do not measure 
anything about a particular worker who might hold that job.  There are therefore no demographic 
details about workers.  Rather than measuring the human capital stock possessed by a worker, as 
proxied by his education level and experience, the NCS measures the human capital 
requirements of a given job.  These requirements are encompassed by ten “generic leveling 
factors,” which are intended to measure various job design attributes consistently across 
occupations. These factors are based on the Federal Government’s Factor Evaluation System, 
which is used to set Federal pay scales,
2 and are measured on Likert scales with ranges varying 
from 1-3 to 1-9. 
•  Knowledge (1-9): The nature and extent of applied information that the workers must 
possess to do acceptable work.  The lowest numbers correspond to blue collar jobs, 
requiring minimal skills or education; the highest numbers correspond to very high-
skilled jobs. 
•  Supervision Received (1-5): The nature and extent of supervision and instruction 
exercised by the supervisor, the extent of modification and participation permitted by 
the employee, and the degree of review of completed work.  Larger values correspond 
to less supervision. 
                                                 
2 For a detailed description of the NCS, see Pierce (1999). 
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•  Guidelines (1-5): How specific and applicable the guidelines are for completing the 
work, and the extent of judgment needed to apply them.  Larger numbers correspond 
to less use of guidelines. 
•  Complexity (1-6): The nature, number, variety, detail and originality of the tasks, and 
the difficulty in determining what needs to be done.  Larger numbers correspond to 
more complex jobs. 
•  Scope and Effect (1-6): The extent to which the nature of the work impacts the work, 
output or service of others within or outside the organization.  Larger numbers 
correspond to greater impact on other activities and persons. 
•  Personal Contact (1-4): Extent of contacts with persons not in the supervisory chain, 
including the difficulty of initiating and performing communication. Larger numbers 
correspond to more contacts or higher-ranking contacts. 
•  Purpose of Contacts (1-4): Nature of contacts, ranging from exchange or clarification 
of information to justifying, defending or negotiating matters involving significant or 
controversial issues.  Larger numbers correspond to more significant contacts. 
•  Physical Demands (1-3): Physical abilities and exertion involved in the work.  Larger 
numbers correspond to more physical demands. 
•  Work Environment (1-3): Risks and discomforts in the physical surroundings or the 
nature of the duties.  Larger numbers correspond to more discomfort or risk. 
•  Supervisory Duties (1-5): Level of supervising responsibility.  Larger numbers 
correspond to more levels of subordinates supervised. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of values of the skill measures.  To better compare across 
skills, Table 1 also includes the mean of each variable, normalized to range from zero to one.  
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These statistics show that most jobs have very minimal supervisory duties.  There are few jobs 
with severe physical demands or extremely risky or uncomfortable work environments.  For the 
remaining skills, there are few jobs in either the lowest or the highest skill categories.  
 
IV. Estimating human capital earnings models using CPS vs. NCS 
The canonical human capital earnings model uses schooling and imputed experience to 
infer the person’s skill level. Over the years labor economists have used a variety of more direct 
measures of skill, particularly scores from “objective” measurement tools such as the IQ test and 
the Armed Forces Qualifying Test, to show that traditional human capital measures are positively 
correlated with these measures of skill. The problem with these measures, however, is that they 
are focused on the individual's innate skills, not the job requirements. Thus they are suitable for 
isolating the portions of earnings that are due to fixed factors related to the individual.  They are 
not, however, good measures of the skill requirements of the jobs themselves.  
The NCS job skill most closely related to traditional worker’s human capital measures is 
knowledge, which is typically coded as that which “would be acquired through a pertinent 
[degree] or its equivalent in experience, training, or independent study”.  To see how a worker’s 
human capital measures compare to the knowledge requirements of the jobs those workers hold, 
we obtain the average knowledge required for NCS jobs in each three-digit occupation and 
compare this to the average education and years of potential experience for workers in those 
occupations in the March 2001 Current Population Survey.  The correlation between knowledge 
and education is .824, while the correlation between knowledge and potential experience is only 
.080
3.  Table 2 summarizes this comparison, aggregating the numbers to the 2-digit occupation 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, the correlation between the average education and average potential experience is -.0783. 
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level.  In general, many of the occupations are ranked similarly along knowledge and education.  
It is less apparent for knowledge and potential experience that the two measure a similar concept.  
In many particular occupations, such as secretary, mail distribution, building and personal 
services, vehicle and machine operating, the workers have many years of potential experience, 
while the jobs do not require a high amount of knowledge.  In these jobs, the additional years of 
potential experience do not result in accumulating additional human capital relevant to 
performing this job.   
We consider whether knowledge plays a similar role to traditional human capital 
variables in predicting wages by estimating a wage model in the CPS using only education, and 
potential experience and its square as explanatory variables, and estimating a wage model in the 
NCS using only knowledge.  Table 3 shows the results of these estimations.  The explanatory 
power of the NCS model is much higher than that of the CPS model. In both samples we predict 
log hourly wages and calculate the average within each 3-digit occupation code.  The correlation 
between these two sets of predicted wages is quite high – .87, suggesting that the measures, 
although somewhat different, do explain wages comparably for the average worker.   
We are interested not only in the explanatory power for the average worker, however, but 
also in the relative explanatory power across occupation groups.  Figure 1 shows both the CPS 
and the NCS residuals of these estimations, averaged across all workers/jobs in each 3-digit 
occupation code.  The data points are sorted in an approximate white collar-blue collar order, 
with executives and managers on the far left and unskilled laborers on the far right.  As indicated 
earlier by the R-squareds of Table 3, neither model fully explains wage variation, but the NCS 
model that controls for knowledge requirements results in smaller overall residuals than the CPS 
model that controls for accumulated human capital.  In both samples there are important 
  11 
differences across 3-digit occupations in the explanatory power of the human capital controls.  In 
the CPS, accumulated human capital explains less variation in both the high skill occupations 
and also in the production occupations.  In the NCS, knowledge explains less variation for the 
production workers.   
 
V. Occupational indicators as a proxy for unobserved skill 
Such findings of inter-occupational wage differentials that are not explained by 
differences of worker’s observed human capital are common.  In fact, such wage differentials 
motivate the inclusion of occupation indicators in many empirical wage estimations.  This makes 
sense if worker ability is poorly measured and the omitted ability variable varies systematically 
across occupations.  When occupation controls are included, oftentimes along with other “job” 
controls like industry
4 and union status, they typically account for a significant portion of wage 
differentials in both gender (Blau and Kahn, 2000) and part-time (Blank, 1990) wage 
regressions. On the other hand, occupation indicators may control for other non-market factors 
that affect wages, including, but not limited to, discrimination and sorting on the basis of 
nonmarket characteristics.   
If we believe that ability is the only unobserved variable, then we believe that wages are 
given by the following wage model: 
(1) Wj = β0 + β1Xj + β2Zj + uj      
where Wj is the wage rate earned in job j, Xj is the observed component of human capital in job j, 
Zj is the unobserved component of human capital and uj is a random disturbance that is 
distributed N(0,σu
2).  It is well established that estimating model (1) without controlling for the 
                                                 
4 Occupation controls sometimes are entered by themselves, other times in conjunction with controls for industry. However, 
because there are only a limited number of occupations represented within many industries (Helwege, 1992), the identification of 
either when both are included is driven from a minority of industry-occupation groups.  
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unknown variable Zj results in biased estimates of β1.  To improve upon our estimate of β1, we 
use a set of occupation indicators as a proxy for the unknown data, where the occupations are 
related to Zj by: 
(2) Zj = γ0 + γ1(occ=1) + γ2(occ=2) + … + γN(occ=N) + vj 
where vj represents the measurement error in the proxy, or the extent to which occupation 
indicators are a “good” proxy for unobserved ability.  Generally we cannot observe this 
relationship, and must assume that the error is distributed N(0, σv
2).  This leads us to estimate: 
(3) Wj = β0 + β1Xj + β2[γ0 + γ1(occ=1) + γ2(occ=2) + … + γN(occ=N) + vj] + uj 
or , 
(4) Wj = (β0 + β2γ0) + β1Xj + β2(γ1(occ=1) + γ2(occ=2) + … + γN(occ=N)) + (uj + β2vj) 
Absent any measurement error, estimation of the model (4) would yield unbiased 
estimates of β1. Even with measurement error, the bias will be smaller in estimating equation (4) 
than if we simply left unmeasured the omitted variable. Generally, we would interpret 
significance of the coefficients on the proxy to mean that the unobserved skills are correlated 
with the wages, although we could not separate β2 and γn. Caution should be exercised in such 
interpretation of this model, however.  In particular, suppose that another unobserved variable, 
Dj, is important to determining wages, so that: 
(5) Wj = β0 + β1Xj + β2Zj + β3Dj + uj
where the unobserved variable Dj is likewise related to the occupation indicators by: 
(6) Dj = α0 + α1(occ=1) + α2(occ=2) + … + αN(occ=N) + wj
with wj again representing the measurement error in the proxy.  Then the wage model we 
estimate is actually: 
(7) Wj = (β0 + β2γ0 + β3α0) + (β2γ1 + β3α1)(occ=1) + … + (β2γN + β3αN)(occ=N) + error 
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which is completely undistinguishable from equation (4).  Thus, we may attempt to interpret the 
significance of the occupation indicators and the increased overall explanatory power of the 
model, as an indication that we have “controlled” for unobserved skill differences, but we may 
just as likely have, in fact, controlled for some other non-market characteristics of jobs that vary 
across occupations as well. 
Before we can address this issue, we first show the bias in estimating the wage model (1) 
without any proxy for the unobserved skills, and then show how the coefficient on knowledge 
and the explanatory power of the model change when we add a full set of 3-digit occupation 
indicators.  In addition to knowledge, we include an indicator for whether the job is a part-time 
job, an indicator for whether it is unionized, and an indicator for whether it earns incentive pay.  
It is important to remember that these variables are characteristics of the job, not of any 
particular worker who performs the job.  In addition to these job features, we include the log of 
the establishment size, indicators for whether the establishment is a non-profit institution, and 
indicators for whether the establishment is located in the Northeast, Midwest or South regions.  
After controlling for these job and workplace features, we then add a full set of indicators for 
each 3-digit occupation.   
Table 4 compares these two estimations.  Adding the explanatory variables reduces the 
size of the knowledge coefficients and increases the overall explanatory power by 5%.  The 
inclusion of occupation indicators further reduces the measured effect of knowledge and 
increases the adjusted R-squared from .747 to .807
5.  Figure 2 shows the dramatic change in the 
pattern and size of the wage residuals resulting from including occupation indicators in the wage 
estimation.  The mean of the average wage residuals is now quite close to zero, and the 
                                                 
5 Due to the extremely large sample size, standard errors of the coefficient estimates are quite small for all variables and we do 
not report them here. 
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differences in explanatory power across occupations is largely eliminated.  Including occupations 
clearly improves the ability of the model to predict the inter-occupation wage differentials that 
are evident in the data and are not explained by human capital.   
Again, it is not at all clear how to interpret this method of “explaining” wage variation 
across occupations.  On the one hand, unobserved skills may vary across occupation, and the 
inclusion of indicators for the worker’s/job’s occupation may be capturing the effect of such 
omitted variables.  If this is the case, it seems quite reasonable to use occupation indicators as a 
proxy for the unobserved variables.  On the other hand, if the wage differentials are due to other 
non-market features of a worker/job, it is important for the researcher to know that the 
occupation indicators are not proxies for unobserved skills, but rather for differences across 
occupation in some other variable. 
With most data on worker demographics, it is not possible to distinguish between these 
two alternatives, because the skill variables are unobserved.  Using the NCS data, however, we 
can investigate the relationship between occupation indicators and some of these often-
unobserved requisite job skills. In addition to knowledge, the NCS contains nine additional 
measures of job skill that are not necessarily captured by traditional human capital variables.  In 
order for occupation indicators to capture these omitted skills, the skills must, in fact, vary 
systematically across occupations.  Figures 3A-I show the average value of each skill within a 3-
digit occupation group.  In a sense, these graphs indicate the estimated γs from equation (2).  
There is considerable variation across occupations.  For supervision received, guidelines, 
complexity and scope and effect, the means are highest for managers, professionals and technical 
jobs.  Sales, clerical and most service jobs have fairly low values of these skills.  Construction 
and precision craft workers have intermediate values, while the machine operators, assemblers 
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and other laborers have the lowest values.  Personal contacts and the purpose of those contacts 
have high values only for the managers, professionals and technical workers, and are consistently 
low across most administrative, service and production jobs.  Physical demands and work 
environment are similarly low for most managers, professionals, technical, sales and clerical 
jobs, and higher for those in services and production.  Lastly, supervisory duties are quite high 
for the executive managers, much lower for professional and technical jobs, and at their lowest 
for all other groups, with the exception of occupation codes that are specifically designated as 
“supervisory”, such as administrative supervisors and construction supervisors.  The patterns in 
these figures do suggest that often-unmeasured skills such as these do, in fact, vary 
systematically across occupation and may provide justification for including occupation 
indicators to control for these omitted skill variables. 
To further investigate whether occupation indicators serve as a proxy for such omitted 
skills, we consider how adding the skills to a wage regression affects the overall explanatory 
power of the model, as well as the relative explanatory power across occupations.  We expect 
that including additional skills in a wage regression will not only push the average residual 
toward zero, but will also flatten out the distribution of those residuals across occupation groups.  
To the initial wage model showed in column one of Table 4, we add each of the nine skills, first 
one at a time and then all simultaneously.  In each case we use a set of indicator variables for 
each Likert value the skill takes on. 
The resulting adjusted R-squareds are shown in Table 5.  For supervision received, 
guidelines, complexity and scope and effect, the overall adjusted R-squared of the wage model 
increases with their addition.  The remaining four skill requirements do not add to the 
explanatory power of the model. Not only do the skill requirement variables improve the fit of 
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the model, but even after controlling for occupations, these variables still matter, although the 
change in adjusted R-squared is small.  This indicates that there are aspects of skill not 
represented by the traditional occupation classifications. On the other hand, the large amount of 
additional residual variation explained by the occupation indicators after controlling for the full 
set of NCS skills indicates that something other than skills as measured by traditional human 
capital and the other NCS factors is driving differences in mean wages across occupations.  
One possible nonmarket factor that occupations may proxy for, but that may be unrelated 
to skill is the gender or race of the worker.  The NCS data do not contain any demographic 
information on the workers who hold the jobs surveyed.  Thus, occupation indicators may 
control for unmeasured gender or racial differences that affect wages.  To provide some evidence 
on this question, we calculate from the March CPS the percent of workers that are female and the 
percent of workers that are non-white in each 3-digit occupation, and add the result to the wage 
model with controls for all skills.  The explanatory power increases somewhat, owing to the 
significant negative coefficients on both variables.  Wage differentials across gender and racial 
lines persist even with strong controls for skills, and this may be one nonmarket factor for which 
occupation indicators are controlling. 
Table 5 indicates that the inclusion of additional skills increases the ability of the wage 
model to explain the variation in wages for the average job, although not quite as much as the 
inclusion of occupation indicators.  As we saw in Figure 2, however, the biggest impact of the 
occupation indicators was in reducing the unexplained inter-occupational wage differentials.  In 
order to compare the effect of the skills to the effect of occupation indicators, we calculate the 
average residuals within each 3-digit occupation and examine the distribution across occupations 
of these average wage residuals under each model estimated.   
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Table 6 shows the first four moments of this distribution for each model.  Consistent with 
the visual representation of the residuals in Figure 2, the data indicate that the model with 
occupation controls has mean zero residuals, with very little variation, a slight negative skew 
(with several negative average residuals among the highest and lowest skill groups), and some 
leptokurtosis.  While several of the skills also reduce the mean of these within-occupation 
average residuals, especially guidelines, complexity and scope and effect, even with the 
inclusion of all nine skills, the average remains around 0.015, while including the occupation 
indicators reduces the average to 2.6 E-11.  Additionally, guidelines, complexity and scope 
reduce only slightly the amount of variation across occupations in the size of the unexplained 
component of wages (from .153 in the model with only knowledge to around .14).  Again, this is 
very little reduction compared to the effect of including occupation indicators, which removes 
nearly all the variation across occupations, by design.  Including additional skills increases the 
extent of negative skew and leptokurtosis in the average residuals.  Unlike in the model with 
occupation indicators, the negative skew in these cases does not indicate more negative than 
positive residuals, but rather indicates that more of the average residuals lie below the (positive) 
mean than above, which makes sense.   
To summarize, the addition of often-unmeasured job skill variables does reduce the size 
of the residuals somewhat, and does diminish the differences in explanatory power across 
occupations to a small extent.  The magnitude of these effects is tiny compared to the effect of 
introducing occupation indicators.  This suggests that for the most part, occupation indicators are 
controlling for factors much more important to determining inter-occupational wage differentials 
than the skill differentials measured here.  This leaves two possibilities: there are other important 
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skills not measured by the NCS, or inter-occupational wage differentials are due to other factors 
than differential skill requirements across occupations. 
 
VI. Heteroskedasticity 
One further difficulty with occupation proxies that we have not addressed is that the 
assumptions about the distribution of the measurement error might not hold.  In particular, 
looking at Figures 3A-I, it appears that there is significant within-occupation variation in the 
level of the skills.  If the amount of variation is consistent across occupations, so that Var(vj) = 
σv
2, this is not problematic.  However, the standard errors suggest otherwise for several of the 
skill requirements.  In particular, the figures show that the within-occupation variation is highest 
for scientists, teachers and professors, other professionals, technicians, clerical and 
administrative jobs, construction jobs and precision craft jobs.  This indicates that for these 3-
digit occupation categories, jobs are not as similar as they are within other 3-digit occupations—
especially managers, engineers, sales, supervisors, service jobs and very low-skilled jobs.  If the 
variance of the proxy’s measurement error is related to the proxy itself, then the composite error 
term of the wage model will also suffer from heteroskedasticity. 
To assess the extent to which this is a problem, we test for heteroskedasticity in the wage 
estimation model that controls for knowledge, job and establishment characteristics and the 
occupation indicators as proxies for omitted skills.  Since the patterns of within-occupation skill 
variability are evident in all nine measures of skill, we test whether the heteroskedasticity is a 
function of each measure separately as well as all measures combined.  Although we perform 
these tests on the NCS sample, we are somewhat more concerned about the likely 
heteroskedasticity in a sample where occupation indicators are used in place of additional 
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information on skill requirements beyond the standard human capital measures.  To check 
whether this is a problem in such data, we calculate the 90-10 skill differential by 3-digit 
occupation in the NCS, and test whether this variable is related to the variance of the CPS wage 
regression. The CPS wage regression includes controls for the worker’s race, gender, marital 
status, whether working part-time, whether a veteran, and region of residence. Table 7 shows the 
results of both sets of tests.  There is strong evidence of heteroskedasticity in the NCS wage 
model with occupation controls, related to each of the skills.  Even in the much weaker CPS test 
where the skill level can only vary across occupations, there is strong evidence of 
heteroskedasticity in the model that is related to several of the skills. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the use of occupation indicators as proxies for often- 
unobserved ability or job skill requirements.  We use the National Compensation Survey to 
compare the effects on wage estimations of including occupation indicators versus including 
actual measures of job skills.  In general, researchers cannot do this using traditional data sets 
because skill is often measured only by education and experience, rather than the amount of 
particular skills required by a job (and thus rewarded by wages). 
We find that while including measures of actual job skills requirements improves the fit 
of a human capital earnings model, the extent of the improvement is much less than with 
occupation indicators.  Thus, “controlling for occupation” does not appear to be the same thing 
as controlling for unobserved ability, but rather controlling partially for unobserved ability and to 
a larger extent, other factors that are also related to occupation classifications.  
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We also find that part of the inter-occupation wage variation is due to nonrandom sorting 
along demographic lines: gender and race controls decrease the residual wage variation that is 
not explained by the NCS skill controls but which is accounted for by occupation controls. This 
perhaps is not surprising given the long-running debate regarding the merits of controlling for 
occupation when estimating gender and race wage differentials. Our contribution to the debate is 
the inclusion of direct measures of skill requirements which enable a comparison with variation 
in gender and racial composition as factors explaining individual wage differentials. The 
evidence indicates that part of the residual wage variation accounted for by occupation controls 
is due to skill requirement differences, but part is also due to apparent non-market sorting, 
including sorting along gender and racial lines. Thus controlling for occupation in gender and 
racial wage differential models appears to over-control for skill requirements and potentially bias 
such models away from non-market explanations of wage differentials (e.g. due to 
discrimination), even when the “true” model includes non-market drivers of wage differentials. 
Additionally, we find that there is considerable within-occupation variation in skills, and 
that the amount of variation is not constant across skill levels. As a result, including occupation 
indicators in a wage model introduces heteroskedasticity that must be accounted for. This is at 
least in part because skills are more homogenous in certain occupation categories than in other 
ones.  This causes the measurement error in the proxy to be heteroskedastic, which affects the 
wage error term as well.  In the absence of direct skill measures such as these in datasets like the 
CPS, human capital earnings models that include controls for occupation should also use 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Based on these results, we urge caution in both the use and interpretation of occupation 
indicators as proxies for unobserved skills.  Greater efforts can and should be made to collect 
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data on job skills, which would obviate the need for using occupation indicators.  Additionally, 
new occupation categories might be designed that incorporate job skills data such as the NCS. 
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TABLE 1.  Mean and distribution of responses to leveling factors 
  Raw distribution of responses
 
Normalized 
Mean 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9 
Knowledge  .401  10.5 25.7 19.9 13.5 7.0 14.4 7.2 1.6 0.1
Supervision  rec’d  .449  21.6 41.5 28.8 7.1  1.0      
Guidelines  .408  33.3 36.1 24.7 5.2  0.7      
Complexity  .399  19.3 35.1 35.7 6.8  3.0 0.2     
Scope and effect  .352  30.9 34.5 28.5 4.6  1.3 0.2       
Personal  contacts  .420 44.9 42.7 12.2 0.3         
Purpose of contacts  .369  62.2 28.6 8.5  0.7           
Physical  demands  .528 43.7 54.0 2.3          
Work  environment  .501 51.5 46.8 1.7          
Supervisory  duties  .272  78.7 8.9 10.4 1.8 0.2        
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CPS years potential 
experience
  Mean Rank  Mean  Rank  Mean  Rank 
Health diagnostic  0.8119  1  19.281 1  21.521 18 
Lawyer/judge  0.788  2  17.813 2  19.02 28 
University prof.  0.7515  3  17.494 3  19.023 27 
Executive  0.7342  4  14.303 16  22.99 9 
Engineers  0.7325  5  15.043 12  16.805 36 
Natural sciences  0.7241  6  17.092 4  17.872 34 
Math/CS  0.7226  7  15.858 6  10.729 43 
Public admin  0.7198  8  14.596 13  20.898 21 
Health treatment  0.66  9  15.76 8  12.764 41 
Mgmt-related  0.6555  10  15.19 11  19.79 25 
Teachers  0.6373  11  15.564 9  22.139 12 
Other professional  0.5833  12  16.321 5  20.226 23 
Admin. supervisor  0.5644  13  12.763 29  23.386 8 
Service sales  0.5498  14  14.361 15  21.347 20 
Other technical  0.5478  15  15.815 7  30.405 1 
Sales manager  0.4964  16  13.667 22  22.062 14 
Finance/bus. sales  0.4902  17  14.45 14  20.366 22 
Engineering tech.  0.4854  18  13.459 24  18.86 29 
Health technician  0.4417  19  14.025 18  18.6 30 
Construction  0.4077  20  11.451 38  22.721 10 
Mechanic  0.405  21  12.215 34  18.553 31 
Other precision craft  0.3848  22  12.381 32  22.286 11 
Protective service  0.3831  23  13.52 23  14.64 38 
Computer operator  0.3593  24  14.191 17  21.809 15 
Secretary  0.3406  25  13.695 20  26.373 2 
Other sales  0.3385  26  15.358 10  21.395 19 
Forestry/fishing  0.3232  27  11.402 39  22.065 13 
Records  0.3231  28  13.733 19  19.88 24 
Other transportation  0.2913  29  13.158 25  21.655 16 
Other administrative  0.2901  30  13.148 26  21.579 17 
Machine operator  0.2635  31  11.363 40  23.492 7 
Assembler  0.2564  32  11.908 35  19.288 26 
Vehicle operator  0.2552  33  12.33 33  25.4 4 
Health service  0.2543  34  12.939 28  13.521 39 
Retail sales  0.2484  35  12.677 31  13.034 40 
Personal service  0.2431  36  13.677 21  24.273 6 
Farm laborer  0.2329  37  10.618 43  18.099 32 
Construction labor  0.208  38  10.76 42  17.602 35 
Mail distribution  0.2031  39  12.704 30  25.654 3 
Food service  0.203  40  11.623 36  11.545 42 
Other laborer  0.1944  41  11.089 41  17.926 33 
Building service  0.1928  42  11.463 37  24.315 5 
Handlers  0.1803  43  13.135 27  15.509 37 
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TABLE 3. Comparison of 1997 NCS and 2001 CPS wage 
estimations with only human capital controls 
  CPS NCS
HS grad  .297
***  
Some college  .468
***  
College grad  .835
***  
Advanced degree  1.10
***  





Knowledge = 2    .280
***
(.003) 
Knowledge = 3    .554
***
(.003) 
Knowledge = 4    .843
***
(.003) 
Knowledge = 5    .954
***
(.004) 
Knowledge = 6    1.16
***
(.003) 
Knowledge = 7    1.50
***
(.004) 
Knowledge = 8    1.93
***
(.007) 
Knowledge = 9    2.10
***
(.031) 
    
R-squared  .222  .693 
No. obs.  64,924  135,408 
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TABLE 4. Effect of controlling for occupation in NCS wage estimation 
 1  2 
Knowledge = 2  .227  .179 
Knowledge = 3  .467  .369 
Knowledge = 4  .731  .589 
Knowledge = 5  .883  .783 
Knowledge = 6  1.08  .995 
Knowledge = 7  1.43  1.30 
Knowledge = 8  1.86  1.69 
Knowledge = 9  2.03  1.89 
Part-time job  -.164  -.087 
Incentive pay  .212  .174 
Unionized -.066  -.033 
Non-profit estab.  .169  .166 
Ln(estab. size)  .022  .023 
Located in northeast  .011  .005 
Located in midwest  -.010  -.026 
Located in south  -.059  -.079 
Controls for occupation?  NO  Yes 
R-squared .747  .807 
No. obs.  135,408  135,408 
NOTES: Due to the large sample size, standard errors are very small and are not reported here.  
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TABLE 5.  Effect of adding skills to wage estimation on 
explanatory power of model 
 Adjusted 
R-squared
Knowledge   .747 
Including supervision received  .764 
Including guidelines  .768 
Including complexity  .763 
Including scope and effect  .762 
Including personal contacts  .749 
Including purpose of contacts  .748 
Including physical demands  .747 
Including work environment  .748 
Including supervisory duties  .749 
Including all skills simultaneously  .779 
Including all skills plus % female and % minority  .784 
Including all skills and occupation indicators  .824 
Including occupation indicators  .807 
NOTES: Each line represents the adjusted R-squared from a wage estimation that 
includes all variables listed in TABLE 4 plus the human capital control indicated. 
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TABLE 6.  Moments of the distribution of within-occupation average wage residuals 
for various sets of human capital controls 
  Mean Standard Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Knowledge alone  .0280  .1532  -.9349  14.16 
Including occupation indicators 2.74e-11  9.97e-10  -.0516 8.61 
Including supervision received  .0246  .1434  -1.00  18.17 
Including guidelines  .0195  .1366  -.7194  17.33 
Including complexity  .0190  .1445  -1.438  21.40 
Including scope and effect  .0188  .1406  -1.402  18.86 
Including personal contacts  .0253  .1513  -.8431  14.66 
Including purpose of contacts  .0302  .1545  -.8568  14.02 
Including physical demands  .0277  .1531  -.9514  14.26 
Including work environment  .0241  .1504  -1.14  15.61 
Including supervisory duties  .0311  .1532  -.9129  13.94 
Including all skill requirements  .0151  .1361  -1.321  23.20 
Including all skills plus % female and 
% minority 
.0012 .1345  -1.54  25.26 
NOTES: Each line results from a separate wage estimation including all variables listed in TABLE 4 plus the human 
capital control indicated.  Residuals were collected and then averaged within each of 468 separate 3-digit 
occupations.  






TABLE 7.  Breusch-Pagan tests of whether job skills are a source 
of heteroskedasticity in NCS (CPS) wage estimations that control 
for knowledge (human capital) and occupation 
  NCS CPS
Knowledge --  11.41
***








Scope and effect  1,562
*** 0.00 
Personal contacts  2,207
*** 147.5
***
Purpose of contacts  2,226
*** 162.2
***
Physical demands  163
*** 33.2
***
Work environment  429
*** 214.1
***
Supervisory duties  1,456
*** 126.4
***
All factors  3,964
*** 863.4
***
NOTES: Breusch-Pagan test of heteroskedasticity related to skill indicated. For 
NCS, this tests individual wage residuals with individual reported skill level. 
For CPS, this tests individual wage residuals with occupation-specific median 
skill level. 
* indicates p<.10, 
** indicates p<.05, 
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